Military Chief’s Next Step Through Sham Election
Myanmar’s military chief, Min Aung Hlaing, has officially announced that national elections will be held either in the last week of December 2025 or the first week of January 2026.
The junta leader, who seized power in 2021 citing unsubstantiated claims of electoral fraud in the 2020 general election, revealed this timeline during his early March trip to Russia and Belarus. Specifically, the announcement was made during his March 7 meeting with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko—Min Aung Hlaing’s second visit to Belarus.
There are differing perspectives on the upcoming election planned by the military council. Some view it as a strategic attempt by the junta to gain international legitimacy and install a puppet government. Others believe it is a calculated move to shield the regime from accountability for its atrocities and war crimes.
Another interpretation is that the election is intended to fulfill a long-held personal ambition of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.
He currently holds multiple top positions, including Senior General, Vice President, Prime Minister, and Chairman of the State Administration Council, among others.
To the revolutionary forces and much of the public, however, he is seen as a military dictator—a power-hungry leader fixated on consolidating control. Despite holding numerous titles, there remains one position that he cannot appoint himself to and which the people are unlikely ever to grant him: the presidency.
“That’s why he’s so desperate to hold an election—he wants to run for president,” a veteran political analyst said.
Political observers and much of the public have long anticipated that Min Aung Hlaing’s next step would be to stage an election and claim the presidency through it.
How Can a Sham Election Be Held?
The military council’s election commission announced on April 8 that it plans to hold elections in December this year. The deadline for political parties to register with the commission ended on May 9.
According to the council’s statement, by that deadline, 27 new parties had submitted applications, while 50 existing parties applied for extensions or re-registration, bringing the total to 77 parties.
This suggests that the military council’s planned sham election will proceed with participation from these 77 parties.
“There are rumors that former civil servants and members of the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry were encouraged to form political parties,” said a politician close to local political organizations. However, the latest announcements from the military council indicate that no parties formed by such individuals have been registered. Only a few Rakhine and other ethnic parties were granted registration.
Meanwhile, key pro-democracy groups—including the National League for Democracy (NLD), which won the 2020 election but was later dissolved by the junta, the National Unity Government (NUG), the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), revolutionary forces, and international election observer groups—have repeatedly stated that they will not recognize the military’s planned election.
“Our NLD party has no interest in or recognition for the election conducted by the military council. We do not acknowledge the legitimacy of their election commission. The election is fraudulent and a complete sham,” said a current member of the NLD Central Executive Committee.
A 45-year-old woman from Yangon’s Shwe Pyi Thar Township also said she would not participate: “I’m not interested in their election and will not vote.”
But is mere non-recognition enough? Will boycotting the polls invalidate the election? Can the election—denounced as fake and fraudulent by the NLD, NUG, revolutionary forces, and pro-democracy citizens—be nullified this way? Absolutely not.
A veteran political analyst and official from an election monitoring group called this belief entirely misguided.
“The election will most likely take place. Min Aung Hlaing cannot demonstrate successful governance or economic recovery. This election is his only remaining option,” he remarked.
So how exactly will the military council conduct its election? Apart from confirming that it will be held in December, in line with Min Aung Hlaing’s recent announcement, the election commission has yet to reveal any details about the process.
Union Election Commission Chairman U Ko Ko stated at a coordination meeting on May 9 that the election scheduled for December will differ significantly from previous elections and must be carried out with great care.
“The upcoming election is not like past ones. The conditions under which it will be held, the electoral processes involved, are more complex. The electoral system, the election period, and the voting methods will also be different,” U Ko Ko explained.
Meanwhile, NUG Acting President Duwa Lashi La stated in his 2025 New Year’s speech that revolutionary forces now control up to 75 percent of the country, leaving only a quarter under the military council’s control.
As a result, political and military analysts believe that the NUG and revolutionary forces consider the junta’s planned election to be unfeasible.
While the NUG and resistance groups continue to denounce and condemn the planned election, they have yet to issue an official statement on preventing it. However, some local defense forces and People’s Defense Force (PDF) units have issued warnings to those involved in preparing for the polls.
Some members of the public and political observers, however, express skepticism toward the claims made by revolutionary forces.
“Even a basic overview shows they’ve lost some towns they once held. In Myanmar’s heartland, the junta controls the cities, while local defense forces operate mainly in the villages, engaging in intermittent battles. They have attacked and briefly occupied cities, only to retreat and allow the military to reclaim them. That’s not true territorial control,” said a political and military analyst.
An official from an election and political monitoring group echoed this perspective.
“I don’t know what data the NUG is using to claim that the military council controls only 22 percent of the country. According to the military council’s election commission, they currently control over 150 cities. Around 110 cities are contested, and the revolutionary forces only control about 85,” he said.
Regarding how the junta might proceed with the election, veteran 88 Generation political analyst U Mya Aye commented, “A nationwide election is impossible under the current ground conditions. They may try to conduct it in stages. I believe they’ll push ahead with a disorganized, forced process.”
Both local and international political analysts believe the election could resemble the census conducted in October 2024.
“Polling stations may be set up only in cities, not in rural areas. It could follow the same pattern as the census,” said a political researcher.
Another expected method is deploying military forces to secure and blockade election zones.
In conflict areas, the junta might implement alternative voting systems such as skipping polling stations altogether and using door-to-door ballot collection.
In major cities like Yangon, Mandalay, and Naypyitaw, it is speculated that elections will be conducted with full security at designated polling stations.
Does Not Voting Invalidate the Election?
The 2008 Constitution, drafted by the military, and the current election laws contain no provision requiring a minimum voter turnout for an election to be considered valid.
This means that even with very low participation, the election can still be deemed legitimate under existing law.
“Myanmar’s election law doesn’t require a minimum percentage of voter turnout. Even if only 10 percent of eligible voters participate, the election is still valid. There’s no need for 50 percent,” explained the political researcher mentioned earlier.
Additionally, unlike previous elections, the military council plans to use the Proportional Representation (PR) system instead of the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) system. Under PR, seats in parliament will be distributed based on the proportion of votes each party receives.
“I don’t understand this system. We thought if we didn’t vote, the election wouldn’t be valid. But it seems we can’t do anything to stop it. I have no desire to vote, and I still don’t know which parties are competing or how,” said a woman in her 30s from Yangon’s Mayangone Township.
How Can the Parliament Be Convened and a Government Formed?
Myanmar’s parliament consists of three bodies: the House of Representatives (Pyithu Hluttaw), the House of Nationalities (Amyotha Hluttaw), and the Assembly of the Union (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw). Each state and region also has its own parliament.
The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw is made up of 664 members—440 from the Pyithu Hluttaw and 224 from the Amyotha Hluttaw.
According to the 2008 Constitution, the military is automatically granted 25 percent of the seats in both chambers—amounting to 166 military representatives—enabling the military council to help convene parliament.
If political parties that contest the election win more than 166 seats, they will secure a majority in parliament, making it possible to convene the legislature.
Once parliament is convened, forming a government becomes relatively straightforward.
“If that happens, some countries might recognize them. Even now, China, Russia, and their allies appear to be leaning toward supporting the military council. If the election succeeds, it won’t be easy for us. It’s concerning,” said a politically engaged man in his 40s from Yangon.
How is the President Elected?
The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw nominates one Vice-President each from three sources: the Pyithu Hluttaw, the Amyotha Hluttaw, and the military.
After these nominations, all members of parliament vote to elect the President, First Vice-President, and Second Vice-President from among the three nominees.
The Military Chief’s Step
In 2019, ahead of the country’s 2020 general election, military chief Min Aung Hlaing engaged in activities that resembled an election campaign.
That year, he met with leaders of various religious communities, including the Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA)—an over-century-old organization that continues to support him—as well as Christian and Muslim leaders. He visited mosques and churches and made efforts to connect directly with the public.
Following the 2020 election and before parliament could convene, it was reported that Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing met with State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint to request nomination for the presidency. However, the National League for Democracy (NLD) declined. According to senior military officials cited by independent media after the coup, this rejection contributed to the military’s claim of electoral fraud and the eventual coup.
Now, Min Aung Hlaing’s position is very different from what it was in 2019 or 2020. With a successful election, he is in a position to advance toward the presidency without needing negotiations or approvals from others.
There are two potential paths for him to achieve this ambition. One is to contest in the election and be elected as an MP, then become President through parliamentary procedures. The other is to be nominated as a Vice-President by the military bloc and then ascend to the presidency through a parliamentary vote.
Most observers dismiss the first scenario and consider the second the more likely path.
Thus, it remains to be seen whether Min Aung Hlaing will finally take the ultimate step toward the presidency.
A political researcher who also holds a senior position in a political organization commented on the general’s next move, “I believe he has long dreamed of becoming President. At this point, (Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services) General Kyaw Swar Lin still needs about two and a half years to consolidate power. So Min Aung Hlaing will likely aim to become President while retaining control of the military.”
However, some argue that elections alone cannot resolve the current political crisis.