The Role of TNLA-Like Forces in Achieving Victory in the Spring Revolution
The people of Myanmar are aware of the extent to which China has been involved in, interfered with, and influenced the country’s affairs. The ban on using the word “China” in the Burmese language on social media underscores the growing public resentment, as Beijing is seen as prioritizing its own interests at the expense of Myanmar’s sovereignty.
However, no organization has dared to openly challenge China, one of the world’s most powerful nations. Instead, many continue to refer to it as a “close relative.”
Now, with one group breaking that silence, many are likely to take a keen interest in discovering who it is.
The group in question is the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF/TNLA), formed by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) in northern Shan State—an armed group widely believed to be under strong Chinese influence.
“We are being threatened by China,” said Colonel Tar Pan La, Joint Secretary-General-2 of the PSLF/TNLA, during the group’s first press conference in over four years since Myanmar’s 2021 military coup. The statement was made in response to questions from reporters on May 4.
The press conference was led by Colonel Tar Pan La and PSLF/TNLA spokeswoman Lway Yay Oo.
In response to one of two questions posed by CJ Platform, Colonel Tar Pan La said they were facing both pressure and threats from China.
“It’s rare to hear such a candid answer. They must be under serious pressure from China,” commented one political observer.
Colonel Tar Pan La referred specifically to a threatening letter sent by the Chinese government on August 30 last year.
“Everyone knows China sent us a letter last year—it was clearly a form of pressure,” he said, speaking in a tone that reflected both concern and sincerity.
The letter, which arrived amid the second wave of Operation 1027, bore the seal of the State Security Committee of Ruili, Yunnan Province. It urged the TNLA to cooperate in maintaining peace and stability along the border and warned them to eliminate actions that might endanger Chinese nationals, businesses, and property inside Myanmar. The language was pointed and coercive.
The letter warned: “Otherwise, China will take further measures to intimidate and discipline, and the TNLA will bear full responsibility for the consequences.”
During the May 4 press conference, titled “Current Political and Armed Conflicts and April Affairs,” the TNLA also disclosed that during a meeting with Myanmar’s military council on April 28 and 29, they faced simultaneous pressure from both the junta and China.
The junta reportedly demanded that the Ta’ang forces withdraw from the 12 towns and villages they had seized during both phases of Operation 1027—including Nawnghkio, Kyaukme, Hsipaw, Mogoke, and Moe Meik—and retreat to the designated Palaung Autonomous Zones of Namhsan and Mantong.
However, the PSLF/TNLA rejected the proposal, resulting in the collapse of the talks, said Colonel Tar Pan Hla.
The negotiations also failed to produce a ceasefire agreement. The PSLF/TNLA had demanded that the military council halt all hostilities in the area—including airstrikes, drone attacks, and heavy artillery fire—and guarantee freedom of movement for civilians.
“Technically, the talks have not yet failed during the negotiation process. Further dialogue has been scheduled for August,” Colonel Tar Pan Hla explained.
He added that the joint blockade imposed by China and the military council on the 12 towns currently under PSLF/TNLA control has had a direct impact on local residents.
“Since the first half of 2024, China and the military council have blocked all access routes. Initially, they closed four major roads. By June, they had implemented the ‘five cuts,’ severely worsening the humanitarian situation,” he said.
The junta’s five-cut strategy includes cutting off water, electricity, fuel, internet access, and transportation—crippling daily life in affected areas.
Despite over a year of blockades, the PSLF/TNLA has not surrendered like the Kokang Army (MNDAA). Instead, it has openly spoken out about China’s pressure and threats.
While China initially threatened to forcibly halt the fighting, it eventually shifted tactics, persuading the military council to come to the negotiating table after failing to rein in the junta.
Speaking on China’s role, Colonel Tar Pan Hla said, “China’s involvement in Myanmar’s peace process is crucial, as it is organizing the talks.”
Observers note that China’s intervention in the Spring Revolution peace efforts began with Operation 1027.
After failing to pressure the junta into cracking down on cross-border online scam syndicates in northern Shan State, China turned to the northern Three Brotherhood Alliance—the Kokang Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang Army (TNLA), and the Arakan Army (AA).
The well-known Operation 1027 was launched on October 27, 2023.
Initial statements from the Three Brotherhood Alliance indicated that cracking down on online scam gangs went hand in hand with efforts to dismantle Myanmar’s military dictatorship.
Soon after, the Three Brotherhood Alliance, in coordination with People’s Defense Force (PDF) units, achieved battlefield successes that even China had not anticipated. Revolutionary forces across the country—particularly in northern Shan State—swiftly shifted from defensive resistance to large-scale offensive operations.
As momentum built, the Chinese government, which had been openly interfering in Myanmar’s internal affairs, aligned itself with the military council instead of supporting the ethnic armed groups.
By February, following the first phase of Operation 1027, the junta and the northern Three Brotherhood Alliance entered into negotiations.
However, the objectives of the talks varied widely among the three parties. China aimed to broker a ceasefire to protect its own interests and regional stability. The military junta sought to reclaim lost territory without further fighting. Meanwhile, the northern alliance entered the negotiations with the intention of securing a ceasefire while retaining the territories they had captured.
The TNLA also adhered to a similar set of three core principles.
“The differing interests have led to different approaches in the negotiations,” said PSLF/TNLA Colonel Tar Pan La during a press conference on May 4.
After more than a year of tripartite talks, both the MNDAA and the Kokang Army reached a ceasefire agreement in January last year.
“The Kokang Army no longer resists the demands of China and the military council. The worst part is their silence. They haven’t found a way to push back against Chinese pressure. Their focus has been solely on survival,” said a political observer. “The TNLA, on the other hand, is different. Since the February talks, they have openly voiced China’s demands and pressures. They’ve spoken out boldly, and that kind of courage is essential for any resistance group.”
After months of decisions influenced by both China and the junta, the Kokang Army ultimately surrendered Lashio without a single shot—despite the blood and sweat they had shed to capture it.
“We will not follow the same path as Lashio’s loss,” said Colonel Tar Pan La.
The TNLA’s strategy includes forming alliances with other resistance forces, keeping China informed about Myanmar’s realities, and garnering public support. Their method involves coalition-building, communication with China, and encouraging public participation.
“Actually, China already knows the full picture of Myanmar,” said an observer of Chinese involvement. “Trying to explain things to them is like ‘teaching a monk to read’ or ‘showing a crocodile king how to swim.’ China has already chosen the groups it believes will serve its interests. That is their decision. Meanwhile, revolutionary forces must also form strategies to continue resisting the junta and defending their own people and national interests. I don’t believe further explanations to China will change anything.”
According to PSLF/TNLA spokesperson Lway Yay Oo, the Ta’ang forces and the military junta have held seven rounds of talks—including the most recent meetings on February 16–17 and April 28–29.
During these talks, the PSLF/TNLA has faced pressure from both China and the military council, while also enduring the junta’s “five-cut” strategy since January of last year—marking more than a year under siege conditions.
The February meeting failed because the junta did not achieve its demands, while the April talks collapsed after the TNLA refused to surrender five key cities along the strategic Lashio–Mandalay highway.
Therefore, the stability sought by China and the military council’s aim to regain lost territories without a single shot have both become unrealistic goals.
PSLF/TNLA officials have made it clear—both to the people of Myanmar and the international community—that they will not return the territories they gained through blood and sacrifice.
As a result, the Chinese government has come to understand the firm stance of the PSLF/TNLA. Consequently, counter-threats and pressure from China on the group are seen as inevitable—expected both in the immediate future and during the upcoming August talks.
How will the PSLF/TNLA face these pressures? How long can they endure them? How will they respond? And just as importantly, how will the people of Myanmar confront, respond to, and endure the consequences? A political and military analyst has offered the following assessment.
“Now that the TNLA has publicly declared its position, it suggests they have a certain strategy in place. However, I doubt they can hold out indefinitely. At the August meeting—or perhaps beyond—they may eventually concede to some of China’s demands. Only if the resistance forces collectively launch a coordinated, full-scale offensive this year can they hope to break free from China’s threats and bring an end to the cycle of military dictatorship once and for all.”